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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper investigates the issue of fuel subsidy reform in Malaysia by analysing the direct 
welfare impact resulting from fuel subsidy removal. Using the Household Expenditure Survey 
2004/2005 with a sample of 4227 households, the analysis is carried out by segregating 
households into 3 different income groups and the welfare impact due to subsidy cut is 
measured. The results show that the reduction in welfare due to higher price is larger for the 
middle 40% compared to the top and the bottom 40%. This is due to the fact that the middle 
40% has a larger budget share on fuel. Fuel subsidies are found to be costly in protecting 
poor households due to substantial leakage of benefits to higher income group but the 
welfare loss for the lower income group due to subsidy cut is somewhat higher in relative 
term due to the smaller size of their income. Thus, while subsidy reform is undeniably 
necessary, our findings suggest that it must be carried out cautiously. Our study suggests that 
the reform must be accompanied with strategies and programs to mitigate the welfare loss, 
not only for the lower income but also the middle income group as well. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
Fuel subsidies have long been used in many countries, both developed and developing, to 
encourage the production of goods and services through lowering the cost of production and 
in certain cases to lighten the burden of rising prices on consumers. As in other countries, the 
Malaysian government has been subsidizing fuel products where they are sold below the 
market price. Evidently, fuel subsidy has made a hole in the country’s budget, contributing to 
the fiscal deficit, which stood at 3.2% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2007 when the 
price of petrol was at less than one-half of what it is today. In 2010 alone, the subsidies cost 
the government nothing less than RM9 billion, equivalent to 4.4% of the total budget.  
 
Due to high cost of subsidies, fuel subsidy reform is on the top agendas of many countries all 
over the world. Malaysia is among the countries that are implementing such a policy reform. 
In theory, it is thus proved that, rationalizing fuel subsidies could remove market distortions, 
improve efficiency in the oil market and relieve the government from its financial burden and 
fiscal problems. In 2008, the Malaysian Government had decided to reduce the subsidy on 
petrol due to price hike in the world market which caused pump prices to jump by 40%. 
Another phase of subsidy reductions for petrol, diesel, and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) 
came into effect on 16
th
 July, 2010. In a statement, country’s Prime Minister's Office said, 
subsidies for RON95
1
 petrol and diesel will be reduced by five cent per liter and LPG by 10 
cent a kilogram.  RON97 petrol will no longer be subsidized. It will be subjected to a 
managed float under which the price will be determined by the automatic pricing mechanism.  
Malaysia also found it necessary to embark on subsidy reform in order for the country to 
overcome its fiscal challenges and substantiate its support for environmental policies. 
Perhaps, the Prime Minister has reaffirmed the position of his government on fuel subsidy 
reforms; though he said the reform will take a gradual process to avoid adverse effects. 
 
The move undertaken by the government to rationalize fuel subsidy has sparked mixed 
reactions from various segments of the society. Basically the reactions fall under two 
opposing views. The proponents of fuel subsidy reduction basically argue on the premise of 
efficiency, i.e. fuel subsidy removal will remove market distortions and thus consumption 
and investment decisions will be made based on true price signal. On the other hand, the 
opponents of fuel subsidy removal basically argue on the basis of equity, i.e. the removal of 
subsidy may adversely affect the lower income groups. Both arguments have their own 
merits. Nevertheless the appropriate action to be taken entails an in-depth investigation on the 
impact of phasing out fuel subsidy on the overall welfare of the society. Based on this line of 
arguments this paper investigates the distributional welfare impact through the direct measure 
of welfare impact on household resulting from subsidy rationalization.  Following the 
introduction in the first section, section 2 will look at the empirical evidence on fuel subsidy 
removal. Section 3 will discuss the method and data used in the study followed by analysis of 
the welfare impact in section 4. Section 5 concludes the study and provides some policy 
recommendation. 
 
2.0 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCES ON FUEL SUBSIDIES REMOVAL 
 
There are economic arguments for removing fuel subsidies. Some said fuel subsidies are not 
efficient as they result to distortions in the economy; and also inequitable as the rich people 
                                                          
1
 The difference between Ron97 and Ron95 is the chemical composition in terms of octane level. The former 
has higher octane rating which helps engines with higher compression ratios to run very fast. 
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receive more of the benefits than the poor. Studies have shown that fuel subsidies are 
ineffective in fuelling economic growth or in ensuring equitable distribution of income. In 
fact, most of the studies suggest that fuel subsidies hamper economic growth and undermine 
the principle of equity, therefore should be reduced if not wash out  completely. A study on 
Gabon, by El Said Leigh (2006) revealed that, the richest 10% of the individuals receive 
about one-third of the total subsidy. Meanwhile, the poorest 30% of individuals receive only 
13% of all the subsidies. This shows that the benefit of maintaining low prices is captured 
mostly by higher income groups, reflecting their large share in total income and consumption.  
Therefore, fuel subsidy becomes an inefficient instrument for protecting the poor households 
and ascertaining equity. 
 
Experiences from the countries that implemented the reform have shown a remarkable 
improvement in social services delivery. For example, Beers and Moor (2001) based on 
simulation analysis, reported an increase in global welfare of $35 billion if consumer 
subsidies in non-OECD countries are removed. Real income for the world as a whole would 
increase by 0.7% annually while the terms of trade would improve by 0.5% per year. 
Furthermore, in most countries where energy price reform had taken place, such as in 
Colombia, Ghana, Indonesia, Turkey and Zimbabwe, GDP growth has been higher than 
before the reform.  
 
Removing consumer subsidies in eight large non-OECD countries produces efficiency gains 
and economic growth of 0.7% GDP. In 1998, Russia experienced efficiency gain of 1.5% in 
GDP and 17% of CO2 emissions as a result of 33% reduction in fuel subsidies. Similarly, 
Indonesia had experienced 0.2% efficiency gain in real GDP and 11% reduction in CO2 
emissions due to 28% increase in fuel prices.  Venezuela reduced fuel subsidies by 58% and 
recorded 1.2% efficiency gain in GDP and 26% fall in CO2 emissions, (Beers and Moor, 
2001). 
 
A number of studies confirmed that benefits of fuel subsidies are regressively distributed. 
Coady et al. (2010) discovered that over 80% of the total benefits on gasoline subsidies go to 
the richest 40% of households. For diesel and liquefied petroleum gas, respectively, over 65% 
and 70% of benefits go to these income groups. Evidence has shown that, subsidies, 
particularly fuel subsidies, are costly when compared to other alternative policies. A recent 
study on developing countries, conducted by Granado, Coady and Gillingham (2010), shows 
that, the cost of transferring one dollar to the 20% poorest households via gasoline subsidy is 
around 33 dollars. They further argued that, if 15 dollars out of every 100 dollars which is 
allocated to a safety net program is absorbed by administrative costs and 80% of the 
remaining 85 dollars in beneficiary transfers reaches the poor (or 68% of the total budget), 
then the cost-benefit ratio for such a program is 1.5 dollars (i.e., $1/0.68). This shows that the 
opportunity cost of subsidizing fuel is high and costly. This justifies the subsidy reform 
embark upon by many countries including Malaysia.   
 
On the other hand, recent experiences in Colombia, Ghana, Indonesia, Turkey and Zimbabwe 
have shown that, rich households spend a lower proportion of their income on energy than 
poor income households do. The maximum loss in income for the rich was very small, 
ranging from 1% to slightly over 3%. In all cases, the biggest losers were poor urban 
households – the largest users of commercial fuels. Oktaviani et al. (2007) use a CGE model 
to analyze the elimination of fuel subsidies in Indonesia, for the increased prices of 12% in 
2000, 30% in 2001 and 29% in 2005.  They concluded that the short to medium-term 
macroeconomic performance of the economy was impaired by the removal of the subsidies, 
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due to a reduction in household incomes and increase in domestic prices. Furthermore, the 
reduction of fuel subsidies increased the overall incidence of poverty in the Indonesian 
economy from 8.9% to 12.9% of the population, with rural areas worst affected. On the other 
hand, the authors note that there is little difference in terms of inequality over the period, and 
declines in household incomes were fairly uniform across income groups (World Bank, 
2010a).    
 
Abouleinein et al. (2009) studied the impact of phasing out fuel subsidies in Egypt over a 
five-year period. Using a CGE model, it shows that the elimination of energy subsidies, 
without any offsetting policy actions, would reduce average annual GDP growth by 1.4 
percentage points over the reference period and depress the welfare levels of households at all 
levels of the income distribution. However in terms of income inequality, the study also 
revealed a reduction in the level of inequality among the income groups. This reflects the 
larger welfare impact on households in the richest quintile of the distribution (World Bank, 
2010b). 
    
3.0 METHODOLOGY 
 
This study evaluates only the direct welfare effect using partial equilibrium approaches on the 
assumption that consumers do not shift their demand from fuel despite the price change. This 
assumption is important because in reality, the fuel price elasticity of demand is very low 
(inelastic). To determine the welfare effect, households are divided into different income 
groups and their (groups) shares of expenditure on fuel consumption to their total expenditure 
are obtained. For each group, the budget share is calculated by dividing the group’s fuel 
expenditure by total group expenditure. Multiplying budget shares by the percentage increase 
in fuel price gives a first-order estimate of the real income effect of the reform. The equation 
for calculating the direct effect is given as: 
 
𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑓 =  ∑ ∑
𝛼𝑖𝑔
𝜀𝑖𝑔
∗ %∆𝑃𝑖
𝑐
𝑔𝑖 ……for the i
th
 refined petroleum product and g
th
 income group.                            
 
Where: 
 
(Deff) = the direct effect 
∝ = household expenditure on fuel (RM) 
𝜀 = total household expenditure (RM) 
%∆𝑃i 
c
 = percentage change in price   
 
The distribution of the welfare impact from a price increase is classified as progressive, 
regressive or neutral. If the percentage welfare loss increases with household income then it 
is said to be progressive, but if it decreases with income it is said to be regressive. If it 
somewhat equals across income group, then it is neutral.  
 
This study uses secondary data which were collected from various sources. Mainly the data 
came from Malaysian Department of Statistics, as well as ministry of finance. These include; 
(i) Report on Household Expenditure Survey, Department of Statistic; (ii) Household Income 
Survey, Department of Statistics; iii) Economic Report, Ministry of Finance. 
 
A sample of 4227 households was considered as the representative of the larger population 
(i.e. all households in Malaysia). The relevant demographic information of this sample was 
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used for the analysis. However, the data was from a survey of 2004/2005 which is used as a 
proxy to evaluate the welfare impact of the present reform. This is because the survey is 
normally conducted after every five years, at the time of writing; the 2010/2011 survey was 
not available.  
 
 
4.0 ANALYSIS OF THE MAGNITUDE OF THE WELFARE IMPACT 
 
The sample used in this study (i.e. 4227 households) is divided into three groups based on the 
size of their monthly income; i.e. Top 20 percent, Middle 40 percent, and the Bottom 40 
percent. The first group has an average monthly income of RM7,328 and RM 3,850 as 
monthly average expenditure; the second group has an average monthly income of RM2,633 
and RM 1,905 as monthly average expenditure; while the bottom 40 percent has an average 
monthly income of RM1,080 and RM 931 as monthly average expenditure.  Table 1 provides 
more illustrations on the average income and monthly average expenditure of the different 
income groups. From the table it is showed that the richest 20 percent have the average 
monthly fuel expenditure of RM306 compared to RM167 for the middle 40% and RM70.5 
for the bottom 40 percent. This shows that, the top 20 percent of households in Malaysia 
received more than 4 times the subsidy received by the bottom 40 percent. This goes in line 
with the findings of a study conducted by Coady et al. (2006) that the share of the poorest 40 
percent of households in the total benefits from fuel subsidies ranges from 15.3 percent for 
Bolivia to 25.1 percent for Sri Lanka.  
 
Table 1 
Average income and monthly expenditure per group 
 Income groups Average income 
(RM) 
Group Average 
exp. (RM) 
Average fuel 
consumption per 
month (RM) 
Average general 
exp. for fuel 
consumers (RM) 
Top 20% 7328 3850 306 4,370 
Middle 40% 2633 1905 167 1,976 
Bottom 40% 1080 931 70.5 1,004 
 
The information on Table 2 shows that, the household budget share for fuel is 7.5 percent on 
average. Upon this, the Ron 97 took the highest budget share of 6.9 percent, followed by Ron 
95 with 4.8 percent and 2.3 percent for diesel.  Table 2 also shows their respective (fuel 
products) welfare impact from assimilated price increase of 20 percent, 30 percent and 50 
percent accordingly. 
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Table 2 
 
Budget shares and direct welfare Impacts of fuel price increases 
(In percent of total household consumption)  
 
Expenditure on 
fuel item by all 
households 
Budget Share as 
% of total exp. 
Welfare impact on all households from price increase 
(%) 
20% price 
increase  
30% price 
increase 
50% price 
increase 
RON 97 6.9 1.40 2.0 3.5 
RON 95 4.8 0.96 1.4 2.4 
Diesel 2.3 0.48 0.69 1.2 
Fuel 7.5 1.5 2.2 3.8 
 
The direct impact of fuel price increase on households’ real income depends on the total 
budget share for fuel products as well as the distribution of expenditure across individual 
products. Direct fuel products consumption by the households implies consuming fuel for 
personal end use- which involves, in most cases, for the use of personal vehicle. The data 
show that diesel is seldom used by the households (only 0.3% of the households studied have 
expenditure on diesel). This shows that diesel is mainly consumed in production rather than 
direct consumption.  The budget share for RON 97 is about 7 percent of the total expenditure 
of the households, which is the highest among the fuel products. Increasing the price of this 
product by 50 percent will negate households’ real income by about 3.5 percent. Accordingly, 
if fuel products’ prices are increased collectively by 50 percent, households’ real income will 
fall by about 3.8 percent.   
 
Table 3 presents estimated budget shares on product by income group.  The budget shares for 
fuel as a whole are almost the same for both the top 20 percent and the bottom 40 percent 
groups (i.e. 0.065 for top 20% and 0.068 for bottom 20%). So, the percentage welfare impact 
(direct) resulting from fuel price change is almost the same. This implies that the direct 
impact on households’ real incomes of the price increase is the same for both the high and 
low income groups. From this analysis, it can be seen that hypothetical fuel price increase of 
50 percent will equally negate the incomes of both the high and low income groups by the 
same amount (i.e. 3.5%). What is interesting from the analysis is that it shows for both RON 
97 and RON 95 and fuel as a total, the percentage decrease in real income is somewhat higher 
for the middle quintile compared to the top and bottom quintile. From this, the middle income 
group is more vulnerable to the effects of the reform than any other group. This is because the 
budget share of the group on fuel is relatively higher; therefore any price increase will affect 
their real income most.  
 
In terms of whether the distributional impact of price increase is regressive, progressive or 
neutral, it shows that the distributional impact of price increase on Ron 95 is regressive; 
taking away 2.5 percent of real income from the lower income group, but only 2.0 percent 
from the higher income group (for 50% price increase). This is because the households of the 
top quintile have a lower budget share on Ron 95. In other words, Ron 95 attracts lower 
demand from the higher income group. For Ron 97 and diesel, the distribution of the direct 
impact is slightly regressive as well (3.3 and 3.4) and (1.3 and 1.4) respectively, for an 
assimilated price increase of 50 percent. 
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Overall the middle income and the low income group is bound to suffer more if the 
percentage change in the price is very high ( like 100%), as their income is lower, any 
reduction in the income will be felt more than does the high income group. For example, 
taking 100 percent price increase in fuel products and giving same budget share of 7.0 
percent; the top 20 percent group with an average expenditure of RM 3,849.8 will lose RM 
269.5 of its real income, while the bottom 40 percent group, having RM 931 of average 
expenditure, will lose RM 65.2 of its real income. For the high income group, the amount 
represents only 3.7 percent of the group average income, while for the lower income group is 
6.0 percent. Given the groups average income of RM 7328 and RM 1080 for the highest and 
lowest income groups respectively, clearly the lowest income household will obviously have 
more substantial difficulties absorbing such a large welfare loss given their low initial level of 
consumption.   
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Table 3 
 
 Fuel Budget shares and welfare impact by product and income group 
 
Income 
groups 
 
Average 
Expenditure  
RM 
 
RON 97 
 
 
RON 95 
 
DIESEL 
 
FUEL 
Budget 
share 
 
Direct Welfare impact resulting 
from price change (%) 
 Budget 
share 
 
Direct Welfare impact resulting 
from price change (%) 
Budget 
share 
 
Direct Welfare impact resulting 
from price change (%) 
Budget 
share 
 
Direct Welfare impact resulting 
from price change (%) 
 
20% 
price 
increase 
 
30% 
price 
increase 
 
50% 
price 
increase 
 
20% 
price 
increase 
 
30% 
price 
increase 
 
50% 
price 
increase 
 
20% 
price 
increase 
 
30% 
price 
increase 
 
50% 
price 
increase 
 
20% 
price 
increase 
 
30% 
price 
increase 
 
50% 
price 
increase 
 
Top 
20% 
 
 
3,849.8 
 
0.065 
 
1.3 
 
1.9 
 
3.3 
 
0.040 
 
0.8 
 
1.2 
 
2.0 
 
0.025 
 
0.5 
 
0.8 
 
1.3 
 
0.069 
 
1.4 
 
2.1 
 
3.5 
 
Middle 
40% 
 
 
1,905 
 
0.079 
 
1.6 
 
2.4 
 
3.9 
 
0.065 
 
1.3 
 
1.9 
 
3.3 
 
0.016 
 
0.33 
 
0.5 
 
0.8 
 
0.084 
 
1.7 
 
2.5 
 
4.2 
 
Bottom 
40% 
 
 
931 
 
0.068 
 
 
1.4 
 
2.0 
 
3.4 
 
0.050 
 
1.0 
 
1.5 
 
2.5 
 
0.028 
 
0.56 
 
0.8 
 
1.4 
 
0.070 
 
1.4 
 
2.1 
 
3.5 
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5.0 CONCLUSION 
 
The issue of fuel subsidy rationalisation in Malaysia raises the need to investigate the impact 
of reducing fuel subsidy on household welfare. While the rationale for reducing subsidy is to 
ease the financial burden of the government is commonly understood, its consequences on the 
welfare of the society however remain to be discovered. Here, we investigate the direct 
impact of fuel subsidy reduction on the welfare of consumers (households). We examine the 
direct impact of fuel price increase on households’ real income based on the total budget 
share of household on fuel products as well as the distribution of their expenditure across 
individual products. Besides we also investigate the impact of fuel subsidy removal to 
different household income group. 
 
Our analysis shows expenditure on fuel took about 7.5 percent of total household 
expenditure. Disaggregating expenditure by fuel products shows that the Ron 97 took the 
highest budget share of the consumer expenditure (6.9 percent), followed by Ron 95 (4.8 
percent) and diesel (2.3 percent).  Our study reveals that the highest proportion of fuel 
subsidies’ benefits goes to the highest top 20% of the income group. Our analysis shows that 
this group receives more than four times higher in terms of the benefit from subsidy due to 
higher average monthly expenditure on fuel. Overall, we found that if there is a 50 percent 
increase of fuel per liter in Malaysia, it will decrease households’ welfare directly by about 
3.8 percent. Furthermore, we also discover that the Ron 97 has the highest impact of price 
increase on the household’s income. Doubling the price of Ron 97 will negate household’s 
income by an average of 7.0 percent.  Interestingly the analysis provides evidence that for 
both RON 97 and RON 95 and fuel as a total, the percentage decrease in real income is 
somewhat higher for the middle quintile compared to the top and bottom quintile. It thus 
proved that the middle income group is more vulnerable to the effects of the reform than any 
other group.  
 
While our study appears to provide justification for the removal of existing fuel subsidies 
based on the benefits received from subsidy (where the top 20% benefits more), it thus 
however shows that the distributional welfare impact on the different segments of the society 
needs to be tackled accordingly.  Our study reveals that the removal of fuel subsidy will hurt 
the middle income group the most, compared to the lower or the upper income groups. This 
implies that, while it is important to provide the poorest (or the lower income group) with 
various types of support to help them maintain a decent standard of living, equally important 
is for the policy makers to consider strategies and programs to ease the likely burden facing 
the middle class (middle income group). Besides the rising costs of access to quality 
education and health that already hurt the middle class (middle income group) in Malaysia, 
the removal of fuel subsidy will reduce further their standard of living. Hence, our study 
provides the evidence that the removal of fuel subsidy would likely result in the “middle class 
squeeze” in Malaysia.   
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